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Articles
THERE IS NO FIRST AMENDMENT
OVERBREADTH (BUT THERE ARE
VAGUE FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES);
PRIOR RESTRAINTS AREN’T “PRIOR”;
AND “AS APPLIED” CHALLENGES SEEK
JUDICIAL STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
Larry Alexander*
In this short article I hope to clarify three doctrines that
have produced enormous confusion among lawyers, judges, and
academic commentators. These are the doctrines of First
Amendment overbreadth, prior restraint, and as-applied (as
opposed to facial) challenges. My purpose is entirely analytical,
although analytical clarity will undoubtedly have normative
implications, some of which I shall briefly note.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH
My title correctly suggests that there is no such thing as first
amendment overbreadth despite its apparently well-established
status as a first amendment doctrine. Indeed, given the
conception of overbreadth—a statute is overbroad if it has some
unconstitutional applications—that is utilized in what is taken to
be first amendment overbreadth, there is no such thing as
overbreadth in any constitutional domain.
To see this, consider a hypothetical law that surely
exemplifies first amendment overbreadth if any law ever does:
“No person shall speak, write, or through any other medium

* Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I wish
to thank David McGowan, Miranda McGowan, Grant Morris, Lisa Ramsey, Ted
Sichelman, and Steve Smith for their comments. Any errors that remain are entirely their
fault for not catching.
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seek to communicate any idea to any other person.” Surely, this
hypothetical law is unconstitutionally overbroad, is it not? For a
substantial number of its possible applications—though not all,
as with fighting words, malicious defamations, child pornography, incitements to imminent lawless action, etc.—are
constitutionally immune from prohibition by virtue of the First
1
Amendment.
But now consider this hypothetical amendment to my
hypothetical overbroad law: “This law shall only apply to the
extent that its application is constitutionally permitted.” If the
law were so amended, would it now be overbroad? It is hard to
see how it would be, as by its terms it now has no
unconstitutional applications.
But—and here is the key point—the hypothetical statutory
amendment is already a part of every statute. For Article VI of
the Constitution, which declares the Constitution to be the
supreme law of the land, and by direct implication renders
legally void any state or federal laws inconsistent with the
Constitution, already accomplishes what the hypothetical
2
amendment accomplishes. Or, to put it differently, there would
be absolutely no cost in terms of statutory objectives for
legislatures to append to all laws “to the extent consistent with
the Constitution.”
So my hypothetical amendment to my hypothetical
overbroad statute, which by hypothesis eliminates the statute’s
overbreadth, accomplishes nothing that is not already
accomplished by Article VI. And this, of course, will be true of
any statute. Therefore, there are no overbroad statutes, in the
First Amendment domain or elsewhere.
Note, however, that my hypothetical overbroad statute,
even if it is not and cannot actually be overbroad, still seems
oppressive and capable of chilling free speech. If not because of
overbreadth, because of what? The chilling effect is a product of
the vagueness of the first amendment tests that distinguish
constitutionally-protected speech from speech that can
constitutionally be prohibited. Those are the tests that eliminate
the overbreadth. But because they are vague, they leave the
statute they amend with quite vague margins. Even a citizen
1. Though as we shall see, even that seeming bedrock First Amendment truth
must be qualified. See infra at note 8.
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 “This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .”).
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well-versed in these first amendment tests—perhaps someone
who has gone to law school or has even taught the First
Amendment recently in a law school—will not be at all certain in
a pretty broad swath of situations whether or not his proposed
speech will turn out to be constitutionally protected under extant
first amendment doctrines. Therefore, although my hypothetical
overbroad statute is not actually overbroad, as truncated by
Article VI or a statutory amendment to the same effect, it is
quite vague and will likely chill a considerable amount of speech.
That is its real first amendment vice.
If my analysis of first amendment overbreadth is correct,
and the vagueness of first amendment doctrines is the true
source of the chilling effect worry, then this demonstrates the
incoherence of some Supreme Court overbreadth decisions. The
3
most prominent one is Gooding v. Wilson. The Supreme Court
in Gooding struck down as “overbroad” a Georgia statute
punishing offensive speech. The Court implied that it would not
have struck down the statute had the Georgia courts limited its
application to “fighting words” as defined in Chaplinsky v. New
4
Hampshire. But the implication is nonsensical because the
Georgia statute could not be validly applied except in
accordance with Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky is already a part of the
Georgia statute because the Constitution is already a part of the
5
Georgia statute by operation of Article VI. So the Georgia
statute was not—because it could not be —overbroad. On the
other hand, if the vice of the statute was its vagueness due to the
vagueness of the Chaplinsky “fighting words” test, then that vice
could not have been cured had the Georgia court’s limited the
statute to “fighting words,” the Court’s statement to the contrary
notwithstanding. The Court’s rationale is internally
contradictory.
One final point. There are some laws that are, in a sense,
overbroad in that they have no valid applications. Or, put
differently, the Article VI proviso that is implied in every law
obliterates such laws in their entirety. Such laws have no valid
applications because they contain an illegitimate predicate for
6
governmental action.

3. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
4. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
5. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 541, 549 n.20 (1985).
6. See id. at 544–47.
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Consider laws that ban flag burning, or speech by
Republicans, or speech criticizing the government. These laws
have no valid applications, not because every token of flag
burning, speech by Republicans, or speech criticizing the
government is constitutionally immune to regulation, but
because such acts are constitutionally immune to regulation
under rules the terms of which refer to certain disfavored ideas or
persons.
Consider flag burning. When the Supreme Court held it to
be protected under the First Amendment, all it really held is that
it could not be banned under laws that by their terms punish
7
certain treatments of the flag. It did not suggest that even
expressive uses of the flag could not be punished under, for
example, laws prohibiting burning any object for any purpose in
the street, or laws banning murder even if committed for
expressive purposes by strangling someone with an American
flag. Therefore, expressive uses of the American flag are not
protected under the First Amendment except from laws that
8
make those expressive uses the predicate for the prohibition.
7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 318–19 (1990).
8. In the earlier article I put the point this way:
The Constitution’s individual rights provisions by and large do not protect
specific conduct per se. . . . Rather, the Constitution ordinarily limits the types of
reasons that government may act upon in regulating conduct. For instance,
‘criticizing the government’ is not protected conduct viewed in isolation from
the various ways government might attempt to regulate ‘criticizing the
government.’ ‘Criticizing the government’ may be validly—constitutionally—
regulated if the criticism is broadcast from a soundtruck at night, and the
regulation proscribes the use of soundtrucks at night. ‘Criticizing the
government’ may be validly regulated if the criticism takes place on private
property without the owner’s consent, and the regulation proscribes trespass.
But ‘criticizing the government’ is not validly regulated if the regulation
proscribes, or was motivated by a desire to proscribe, ‘criticizing the
government.’
Now when a statute contains a constitutionally illegitimate predicate of
government action, the statute is void and cannot be applied. If for instance a
statute proscribes ‘picketing,’ ‘mutilating the flag,’ or ‘demonstrations by
blacks,’ the statute cannot be applied as is, nor can it be applied even if
narrowed to ‘violent picketing,’ ‘burning the flag in public,’ or ‘disruptive
demonstrations by blacks.’ The narrowed statute still contains the illegitimate
predicate for governmental action.
Alexander, supra note 5, at 545 (citations omitted). I should point out that the
hypothetical statute forbidding all communication is probably an example of a law
containing an illegitimate predicate for governmental action and therefore has no
constitutionally permissible applications. I should also note that overbreadth invalidation
is not an example of “third-party standing,” as it is sometimes claimed. An overbroad
statute, which I have said is a statute with a vague and chilling constitutional boundary, is
a constitutionally infirm statute, just as are statutes that have constitutionally illegitimate
predicates for government action. And anyone whose conduct is regulated by a
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II. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AREN’T “PRIOR”
Restrictions of speech found in criminal and civil laws are
typically analyzed “substantively” —that is, by whether the
content of speech is protected by the First Amendment against
the particular way in which the law is restricting it, or by whether
the time, place, or manner of the speech, whatever its content, is
being unduly restricted. But there is one type of regulation of
speech that is thought to be special and specially disfavored, the
so-called prior restraint of speech. There are two types of
regulation that fall into this category. One consists of those
requirements that one obtain a license from some agency or
person before engaging in the speech activity. Such requirements
can be based on the particular content of the proposed speech,
such as whether it concerns one’s activities with the C.I.A., or
whether it is a film that might be pornographic. Or they can be
based on the time, place, or manner of the proposed speech,
such as whether it involves door-to-door solicitations, or whether
it involves a demonstration that could impede traffic. The other
type of regulation deemed to be a prior restraint is the judicial
injunction or order when directed against the content of speech
or its time, place, or manner.
Now notice that neither license requirements nor
injunctions are in any sense more prior as restraints than
ordinary statutory and common law restrictions of speech.
Compare them, for example, with some quotidian non-prior
restraint of speech—say, a statute making it a crime to show Xrated movies. Assuming no ex post facto application of the law,
which would be a different issue, the requirement that one
obtain a license to show an X-rated movie will, it is true, exist
prior to the act of showing such a movie, as will an injunction

constitutionally infirm rule has standing to object to it.
Put differently, while violent picketing, burning the flag in public, and disruptive
demonstrations by blacks are all activities that can be validly proscribed under
some statutes—for example, statutes proscribing violence, public burnings, and
disruptive demonstrations—violent picketing, burning of the flag, and disruptive
demonstrations by blacks do not mark off legitimately regulatable subcategories
of legitimately regulatable activities. They are therefore underinclusive with
respect to legitimately regulatable activity. The government may ban all
violence, but not just violence associated with picketing. The government may
ban all public burnings, but not just those that involve the flag. And so forth.
Id.
I should add that there are conceptual mysteries that attend the Constitution’s focus
on rules and their validity as opposed to act tokens and their immunity from regulation.
See Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time, 6 LEGAL THEORY 391 (2000)
(discussing the past and future effect of rules and the permissibility of such rules).
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ordering one not to show such a movie. But so does the statute
making showing such a movie a crime. Both the statute and the
so-called prior restraint are prior in that sense. Moreover, they
are also alike in that the punishments they authorize occur after
the acts that violate them—showing the X-rated movie in the
case of the ordinary statute and the injunction, or showing it
without a license in the case of the licensing requirement.
So in what sense are the prior restraints materially different
from ordinary statutory and common law restrictions on speech?
The answer lies not in their “priorness” as restraints but in the
consequences of violating them. To be sure, they all threaten
violators with punishment. But in the case of ordinary statutory
and common law restrictions, if they attempt to restrict speech
that is constitutionally protected from such restrictions, the
speaker can raise that protection as a defense to the charge of
violation. In the case of the statute making it a crime to show Xrated movies, the violator can claim that the statute violates the
First Amendment and that therefore his violation of the statute
cannot serve as the basis for punishing him. If his claim of
constitutional right to show X-rated movies is accepted by the
court, the court will throw out the charge against him.
The case is otherwise with the licensing requirement and the
injunction. Take the injunction first. If Al is enjoined from
showing X-rated movies, and Al ignores the injunction and
shows such movies, he will be punished for contempt of court.
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, if Al, on being
hauled into court on the contempt charge, protests that he has a
constitutional right to show X-rated movies, and that the court
constitutionally erred in enjoining him from doing so, his protest,
even if correct, will not foreclose the court’s punishing him for
contempt. This is because of a judicially-created doctrine called
the “collateral bar rule.” That doctrine in essence says that
judicial orders from courts that have jurisdiction over the person
give rise to an absolute duty of obedience, notwithstanding any
constitutional rights to engage in the enjoined conduct, unless
and until that order is set aside by the court that issued it or by a
9
higher court on appeal.
The upshot is that while legislative orders can be disobeyed
and then challenged on constitutional grounds if suit is brought
against those who disobey them, judicial orders cannot be. If Al

9. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967).

!!ALEXANDER-272-FIRSTAMENDMENTOVERBREADTH3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011 9:42 AM

2011]

FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH

445

is enjoined from showing X-rated movies, he must not do so on
pain of certain punishment, unless and until the injunction is
withdrawn or set aside on appeal. If Al wants to escape
punishment, he must refrain from showing X-rated movies and
seek to have the injunction overturned. This is not the case if Al
is only statutorily prohibited from showing such movies.
The vice of judicial “prior restraints” is then one of loss of
time, which is a real cost if one’s message is time-sensitive. It is
the time the speaker must wait before speaking during which he
tries to convince some court that his speech is constitutionally
protected and thus should never have been enjoined. If he is
correct—his speech is constitutionally protected—then it is the
time lost in fighting the injunction that he would not have lost
had he been prohibited statutorily, a prohibition he could have
ignored with impunity.
That lost time is the temporal element in the prior restraint
of an injunction. Notice the oddity that arises from the judicial
antipathy towards injunctions of speech based on that loss of
time. The loss of time stems from the collateral bar rule that
elevates judicial orders above legislative orders (statutes) and
administrative orders and rules. But the collateral bar rule is
itself a judicial creation. If it were eliminated in instances of
speech injunctions, the latter would operate like personalized
statutes and like statutes could be disobeyed with impunity if the
enjoined speech were constitutionally protected. In other words,
the loss of time, which makes judicial injunctions of speech
constitutionally disfavored, is solely a product of the judiciallycrafted collateral bar rule. The judges giveth, then taketh away!
The foregoing analysis also shows why the Supreme Court
dissenters were correct and the majority wrong in the case of
10
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.
In Vance, a court had issued an injunction that by its terms
enjoined exhibiting movies that met the constitutional definition
of unprotected obscenity. The majority overturned the
injunction as an invalid prior restraint of speech. The dissent,
however, pointed out that by the terms of the injunction, only
films that were not constitutionally protected would constitute
violations. Therefore, if Universal Amusement showed any film
that it had a constitutional right to show, it would not have
violated the injunction. And if it was hauled into court on a

10. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
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contempt charge, it would not need to raise a constitutional
defense to that charge, something the collateral bar rule
forecloses. Rather, it could use the constitutionally-protected
status of the film to deny that it had violated the injunction. And
denials of violations are, of course, not foreclosed by the
11
collateral bar rule.
Let me turn now to the other form of prior restraint, the
license requirement. This is the classic form of prior restraint,
one that dates back to the English requirement of censor
approval prior to publication.
There is no collateral bar rule with respect to licensing
speech, but there is something similar. For if the licensing scheme
is itself valid, then the would-be speaker must wait until he gets
the license, either directly from the licensing authority, or if
denied by that authority, indirectly from having a court order the
licensing authority to grant the license. That is because if the
licensing scheme is valid, speaking without the license is
punishable, even if, given the constitutionally-protected nature
of the speech, the license should have been granted.
Licensing schemes, like injunctions, hurt constitutionallyprotected speech most severely when the speaker’s message is
time-sensitive. This suggests that licensing schemes should be
evaluated constitutionally based in part on how time-sensitive
the speech that requires a license is likely to be, as well as how
expedited the licensing process and judicial reviews of denials
are. Courts need not adopt a dichotomous valid or invalid
approach to licensing schemes. They could, for example, deem
them valid for a certain period of time after which their validity
would expire and the speaker would no longer be required to
seek the license.
Moreover, the time-sensitivity of the speech is not the only
relevant criterion in assessing licensing schemes. Frequently, the
government and even the speaker have an interest in assessing
the constitutional status of the speech prior to its communication
to others. The government, for example, may believe that
revelation of constitutionally-unprotected classified information
will be irreparably damaging to its legitimate interests and so
11. It is true that the trial of a contempt charge will be before a judge and not a
jury, whereas trials of statutory or common law violations will, at the option of the
defendant, be before a jury as well as a judge. That distinction, however, has nothing to
do with an injunction’s being more “prior” than a statute. Nor does it have any obvious
implications for the First Amendment. (I thank Steve Smith for pointing out this
distinction between injunctions and statutes beyond that of the collateral bar rule.)
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would like to review any possible constitutionally-unprotected
information before it is published. Indeed, the speaker himself
will frequently be uncertain whether the classified information is
constitutionally protected or unprotected, or whether it will
injure vital government interests, something he, like the
government, might wish to avoid. Therefore, both he and the
government might welcome the prior-to-publication review
process of a licensing scheme. And the same would be true of Al
and his X-rated movies. Given the vagueness of the line between
constitutionally-unprotected (obscene) X-rated movies and
constitutionally-protected X-rated movies, if there is a statute
that punishes showing the former, Al might welcome the
presence of a licensing scheme that would determine on which
side of the constitutional line his movies are located before he
shows them, a scheme that eliminates the otherwise sizable risk
of error he would run if he had to determine this for himself. An
error on the side of caution would cost him revenue. An error on
the other side would cost him a fine or jail time. The licensing
scheme is a less risky and less costly alternative, particularly
since X-rated movies will probably not have time-sensitive
content.
III. “AS APPLIED” CHALLENGES SEEK JUDICIAL
STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
When statutes are “facially” challenged, and the challenge is
upheld, the statute is declared a legal nullity. Nothing of it
remains that can be validly applied in any situation. (It may, of
course, remain in the statute books. And if the court that has
upheld the facial challenge to it is later reversed, or reverses
itself, the statute may be resuscitated without the need for
legislative reenactment.)
Facial challenges are easy enough to comprehend. The rule
in its entirety is constitutionally infirm. The reasons for this
might be of many different types. One already mentioned is that
the rule contains an illegitimate predicate for application, such as
when it discriminates based on viewpoint or speaker (or on a
multitude of other forbidden grounds, such as race, ethnicity,
gender, alienage, age, disability, religion, etc. etc.). Another, also
already mentioned, is when the rule is overbroad because of a
vague and chilling constitutionally-imposed boundary. And
there are still others, as when the law tramples on fundamental
rights involving procreation and sexuality, or when local law is
preempted by state law, or state law by federal law.
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If constitutionally void laws subject to facial challenges are
easy enough to comprehend, what about laws that are only
unconstitutional “as applied”? What is their nature, and why do
courts often say that as applied constitutional challenges are
preferred to facial ones?
Think about as applied challenges this way: Suppose rule R
forbids doing act A in circumstances C. Suppose further that C
covers a range of possible circumstances (C1, C2, C3 . . . CN). And
suppose further that applying R to A in some of those
circumstances—say, C4 and C5—would violate the constitutional
rights of those who do A in those circumstances. Finally, suppose
that the rule R&—”it is forbidden to A in C except in C4 and
C5”—has no unconstitutional applications. Then an as applied
challenge to R is a challenge to R that should be upheld only in
circumstances C4 and C5, with the result that R will now be
interpreted to be identical to R&.
Notice, however, that if a court strikes down only those
applications of R that occur in C4 in C5, it has actually amended
R. It has severed R in C4 and C5 and left an amputated R that is
now “R, except in C4 and C5,” or R&. (Or rather, per the analysis
in Section I, the Court has recognized that the Constitution itself
12
limits R to R&, and the Court has left R& in force.) Presumably
then, a court should only entertain an as applied challenge in
cases where it believes the legislature intends the statute to be
severable, and severable at the particular joints at which the
court is asked to sever it. In the case of R, that means that the
court should only grant the as applied challenge if it thinks the
legislature would prefer R& to nothing, R itself being constitutionally ineligible.
Thus, an as applied challenge to a statute is a call for the
statute’s amendment by the courts. It is appropriate when some
applications of the statute are unconstitutional, the statute
amended to remove those applications would be constitutionally
valid had it been enacted in that truncated form—it is not fatally
underinclusive and does not contain an improper predicate for
application—and the enacting legislature is presume to have
13
preferred the amended, truncated statute to no statute at all.

12. I thank Ted Sichelman for this point.
13. For a recent lengthier treatment of this topic, which is basically consistent with
my analysis, see Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2010). Kreit’s article also contains references to the earlier
efforts to explain the distinction.
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* * * * *
The first amendment doctrines of overbreadth, prior
restraint, and as applied versus facial challenge are, as
elaborated by courts and commentators, confusing. I have tried
to clear up the confusion, not by clarifying those doctrines as
they currently exist, but rather by showing what those doctrines
would look like if they were analytically coherent and
normatively attractive.
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APPENDIX
In a recent article, Nicholas Rosenkranz offers a novel and
somewhat radical understanding of constitutional duties and
rights. He asserts that some constitutional duties are imposed on
Congress in its lawmaking capacity, and some are imposed on
14
the executive in its application of laws to individuals. His
leading example of a constitutional provision that speaks to
Congress in its lawmaking capacity is the First Amendment and
its command, “Congress shall make no law . . . .” When Congress
passes a law abridging freedom of speech, establishing a religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, then according to
Rosenkranz, Congress has committed a constitutional violation
at the moment it passes the law, before the law is ever enforced
against anyone. He is a bit vague about whose rights have
thereby been violated—who has “standing” to raise the
15
constitutional violation in court. But he is clear that Congress
has violated the First Amendment when it passes the law—
presumably even if the law is never enforced. (Query: Would it
violate the First Amendment if Congress, in the law, states that
it should not be enforced?)
There are several corollaries to Rosenkranz’s principal
axiom. First, if a law is unconstitutional on the day it is enacted,
it cannot become constitutional because of changes in the
constitutional facts. Perhaps more importantly, the converse is
also true: a law that is constitutional when enacted because
supported by the underlying constitutional facts is always
constitutional even if the supporting constitutional facts have
disappeared—that is, even if the same law enacted today would
16
be unconstitutional.
The second corollary that Rosenkranz draws from his
principal axiom—and the one that bears most directly on my
article—is that laws are either constitutional or unconstitutional
17
“on their face” and are never unconstitutional “as applied.” A
law that is constitutional on its face might be applied
unconstitutionally by the executive, but that is a constitutional
violation by the executive alone. If the law itself calls for that

14. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209 (2010).
15. Id. at 1247–48.
16. See id. at 1284–86.
17. E.g., id. at 1239, 1266–67.
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unconstitutional application, then presumably the law is
unconstitutional in toto and on its face.
This second corollary conflicts with the analysis of “as
applied” unconstitutionality that I have given. I have suggested
that some statutes have parts—sub-rules—that are unconstitutional but that are severable. On this view, statutes that do not
contain illegitimate predicates can be decomposed into subrules, some of which might be unconstitutional. If the remaining
sub-rules are constitutionally permissible—and if the legislature
would prefer retaining these permissible sub-rules over total
invalidation of the statute—then the statute is only
unconstitutional “as applied,” unless the “as applied” technique
would leave the statute with a margin that is too vague
(overbreadth, on my analysis). I cannot find any reason for
rejecting the possibility that statutes might be partially
unconstitutional and severable, either in Rosenkranz’s lengthy
article or anywhere else. So I reject the second corollary, namely
that statutes are never unconstitutional as applied, and stand by
my analysis of as applied challenges.
For what it’s worth, I also reject his first corollary and the
principal axiom from which both corollaries are derived. The
first corollary—that a postenactment change in constitutional
facts cannot affect constitutionality—is bizarre. It entails that
Congress has no constitutional obligation to monitor its statutes
and repeal them when circumstances change in such a way that
were they to enact the same statutes today, the statutes would be
unconstitutional. It rests on the odd notion that constitutional
adjudication is primarily an investigation into the culpability of
the enacting Congress, not an investigation of the law’s
contemporary effects and the culpability of the non-repealing
Congress.
Rosenkranz affirms this bizarre corollary largely because it
seems to be entailed by his principal axiom that provisions like
the First Amendment speak to Congress when it enacts laws—
and only then. But the principal axiom is doubtful. Consider this
alternative conception of constitutional provisions like the First
Amendment: “Congress shall make no law” is elliptical for
“Congress shall have no power to make, as valid law, any
‘law’ . . . .” Unconstitutional “laws” on this conception are of no
legal effect. They only appear to be, but are not actually, laws.
On this conception, the principal form of constitutional
adjudication occurs only as a result of application, or anticipated
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application, by the executive or the courts. That application
might be thought of as a tort. If the plaintiff (the affected party)
sues the official in tort, and the official defends by claiming the
tort is not a tort because it was theorized by a law, the plaintiff
would respond that the law, being unconstitutional and a legal
nullity, cannot immunize the official. On the other hand, a law
that is not enforced is of no constitutional significance.
Rosenkranz’s analysis is bold, radical, refreshing, and
18
unconventional. I have a fondness for analyses of this kind. But
there is another virtue that it lacks. It is incorrect.
In another recent article, Kevin Walsh has recently
dissented from the analysis of severability that I have given in
19
section III. Walsh correctly notes that severability calls for
judges to make difficult counterfactual determinations regarding
what a legislature would have wanted had it realized that its
enactments were invalid and therefore unenforceable in some
but not all of their applications. Would the legislature have
wanted the enactment to be enforced to the full extent it could
be validly enforced? Or would it want other valid portions of the
enactment—or the entire enactment, or even other parts of the
corpus juris—to be unenforced given the unenforceability of a
20
sub-rule of the enactment?
These surely are difficult counterfactuals for judges. Indeed,
the problem is difficult even if a legislature explicitly states that
an enactment (or group of enactments) is inseverable and should
be deemed to no effect if any application is held to be
unconstitutional. That is so because if the first case to arise
involves a constitutionally valid application, the judge will not
know whether the application is authorized until he or she
surveys all possible applications and concludes that none of them
is unconstitutional.
Walsh believes he has a solution to the difficulties of
severability. For Walsh, constitutional judicial review does not
involve eliminating statutes, much less parts thereof, but merely
applying higher law where higher and lower law conflict. Walsh
calls his approach “displacement”: The higher law of the
18. I have myself often tilted at the windmills of orthodoxy. See, e.g., LARRY
ALEXANDER AND & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009); LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN,
DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING (2008); LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005).
19. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U L. REV. 738, 739 (2010).
20. Id. at 740–41.
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Constitution displaces the lower law of statutes where there is,
21
and only insofar as there is, a conflict between them. If an
application of the statute is “displaced,” the statute remains on
the books and in effect unless the state has also enacted a
“fallback law,” that is, a law specifying what is to be done if an
22
application of a statute is held unconstitutional. In other words,
severability would be the result of an explicit legislative directive
in a fallback law, not a judicial divining of the legislature’s
counterfactual intent.
Walsh’s “displacement and fall back law” proposal is
actually just a conclusive presumption of severability in the
absence of a fallback law. Unless the legislature specifies
inseverability and its scope in a fallback law, no application of a
statute will be struck down merely because some other
23
application is unconstitutional.
A conclusive presumption of severability will make matters
easier for the judge in a case that arises under a constitutional
sub-rule after another sub-rule of the same statute has been held
to be unconstitutional. It will not, however, help the judge when
there is a fallback law declaring the enactment’s sub-rules to be
inseverable if the sub-rule in question is constitutional and no
other sub-rule has yet been declared unconstitutional. The judge
will still have to canvas the enactment’s entire set of sub-rules to
see if any one of them is unconstitutional before being able to
decide the case at hand.
Moreover, a conclusive presumption of severability will not,
by itself, obviate the necessity of looking to hypothetical
legislative intent unless it is supplemented by other
presumptions. For consider those statutes that are
unconstitutional because they offend some norm of equality,
whether under the Equal Protection Clause or under dormant
commerce clause analysis. The vice in such cases is that a burden
or benefit has not been extended equally where the Constitution
requires that it be so. Once the court holds the statute
unconstitutional, however, there is a question of remedy
remaining. Should the benefit be extended to the plaintiff (or the
plaintiff be relieved of the burden), or should the benefit be
21. Id. at 777–78.
22. Id. at 780–81.
23. For a proposal on severability that points in the opposite direction from Walsh’s
in the context of challenges to congressional legislation on the ground of absence of
constitutional power, see Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85
IND. L.J. 1557 (2010).
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denied to the comparison class (or the burden extended
thereto)? One might answer these questions by asking the
counterfactual question, “What would the legislature have
wanted in lieu of getting its desired unequal distribution?” Or
one might establish a conclusive presumption in favor of, say,
extending benefits (or removing burdens).
Perhaps the most appropriate remedy would be to excise in
toto whatever enactment or portion thereof contains the
illegitimate predicate for benefits or burdens. If, for example, a
welfare program is enacted that gives $1,000 per month to the
poor irrespective of whether they are black or white, Democrat
or Republican, Christian or Jew, but then the legislature passes a
new law increasing the monthly payments to $1,500 but only for
whites, or Democrats, and so on, the courts should strike down
the new law but leave the prior law in effect. If, however, the
original welfare law gave $1,500 per month to whites but only
$1,000 per month to blacks, the appropriate remedy would be to
eliminate that entire law and its welfare payments. Mere
displacement, however, in the absence of a fallback law, does not
by itself point to a remedy. For if a poor black sought the $1,000
monthly payment, the court would have to decide what precisely
had been displaced by the Constitution—the entire welfare law
or only the $500 extra payment to whites.
In any event, Walsh’s proposal may be meritorious as far as
it goes, but it does not contradict the analyses of severability I
have given. Rather, it proposes a way of determining severability
other than by divining the legislature’s hypothetical intent.

